Reinvention by Seymore, Sean B.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 92 | Issue 3 Article 2
1-2017
Reinvention
Sean B. Seymore
Vanderbilt University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre
Dame Law Review by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
92 Notre Dame L. Rev 1031 (2017)
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 1 21-MAR-17 8:45
REINVENTION
Sean B. Seymore*
ABSTRACT
It is axiomatic that once an invention has been patented, it cannot be patented again.  This
aligns with the quid pro quo theory of patents—the public would receive nothing new in
exchange for the second patent.  Enforcing this rule is done through the novelty requirement,
which bars a patent if the invention is already known.  But the rule is hard to justify if the
original patentee reneged on the quid pro quo by inadequately disclosing how to make and use the
invention.  The inadequate disclosure suggests that the original inventor did not invent any-
thing and the public received no benefit from the original patent.  Nevertheless, the current nov-
elty rules prevent the subject matter from being patented again, even if a subsequent researcher
can figure out how to make, use, and possibly commercialize it.  This novelty bar might destroy
the incentive to engage in research and development—an outcome that would ultimately deprive
the public of a potential benefit (which, as in the case of a drug, could be enormous).  In sum, the
current novelty rules prevent many socially valuable inventions from reaching the public.
To remedy this problem, this Article proposes a new novelty paradigm.  It draws attention to
a situation where a subsequent inventor—the reinventor—seeks to claim subject matter identical
to that claimed by another in an expired patent.  If the reinventor can prove that the subject
matter was inadequately disclosed in the earlier patent, that disclosure will not have a novelty-
defeating effect.  So the reinventor will be allowed to (re)claim the subject matter absent any other
patentability hurdles.  While the public would pay for the invention twice, it would ultimately
benefit from the second period of exclusivity by obtaining an invention that it might otherwise not
have received, a technically robust disclosure, and full possession of the invention at the end of
the reinventor’s patent term.  Thus, reinvention promotes the patent system’s fundamental goals
of encouraging investment, innovation, and the full public disclosure of new inventions.
© 2017 Sean B. Seymore.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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INTRODUCTION
A bedrock principle of patent law is that the same invention cannot be
patented twice.1  Although improvements and modifications of the original
invention can be patented, the identical subject matter cannot be claimed
again.2  For example, consider aspirin—acetylsalicylic acid—patented by
Bayer in 1900.3  Over a century later aspirin-related patents abound (includ-
ing those for a nasal spray, chewing gum, and even a new method of making
the drug).4  But acetylsalicylic acid itself is no longer patentable—not by
Bayer or any other party.5  It has become public property.6
As a theoretical matter, this rule makes sense.  The essence of the U.S.
patent system is a quid pro quo between the patentee and the public.7  The
basic idea is that in order to promote the full disclosure of information about
the invention to the public, the patentee must be given something in return.8
What the patentee gets is the limited period of exclusivity conferred by the
patent grant.9  The public gets detailed knowledge about the invention as
soon as the patent document is published10 and possession of it at the end of
the patent term.11  So if an invention has already been disclosed in a prior
patent, a subsequent inventor cannot give anything to the public that it did
not already possess.12
1 Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 197 (1894) (noting “the well-settled rule that
two valid patents for the same invention cannot be granted either to the same or to a
different party”).  If the second patent issues, it is invalid. Id. at 200.
2 Id. at 197.
3 Acetyl Salicylic Acid, U.S. Patent No. 644,077 (filed Aug. 1, 1898) (issued Feb. 27,
1900).
4 See, e.g., Novel Method of Administering Aspirin and Dosage Forms Containing
Same, U.S. Patent No. 4,885,287 (filed Aug. 9, 1988) (issued Dec. 5, 1989); Pharmaceutical
Chewing Gum Containing Acetylsalicylic Acid, U.S. Patent No. 5,922,347 (filed Jan. 29,
1993) (issued July 13, 1999); Synthetic Procedure for the Manufacture of Aspirin, U.S.
Patent No. 6,278,014 (filed June 6, 2000) (issued Aug. 21, 2001).
5 Miller, 151 U.S. at 197.
6 As the Supreme Court stated long ago, “It is self evident that on the expiration of a
patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly
covered by the patent becomes public property.  It is upon this condition that the patent is
granted.”  Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
7 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974); Special Equip. Co. v.
Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945).
8 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480–81.
9 Id. at 480 (“In return for the right of exclusion—this ‘reward for inventions’—the
patent laws impose upon the inventor a requirement of disclosure.” (citation omitted)).
10 See id. at 481 (explaining that when the information disclosed in a patent becomes
publicly available it adds to the “general store of knowledge” and assumedly will stimulate
ideas and promote technological development).
11 Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 418 (1822) (“The object is to put the public
in complete possession of the invention . . . [so that] its benefits may be fully enjoyed by
the public, after the patent expires.”).
12 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829).
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Indeed, a fundamental principle of patent law is that a patent cannot
issue if it would remove subject matter that is already in the public domain.13
Patent law requires novelty;14 meaning that an invention “must be new, that
is, bestowed for the first time upon the public by the patentee.”15  So if the
subject matter has previously been disclosed, the inventor has not invented
anything and the public would receive no benefit from the patent.16
But the theoretical rationale for the proscription against repatenting
rests on a crucial assumption—that the original patentee adequately dis-
closed the invention in the original patent.  The patent statute requires that
an invention be disclosed in sufficient detail to enable a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art (PHOSITA)17 to make and use the full scope of all that is
claimed without undue experimentation.18  The enablement requirement
lies at the heart of the quid pro quo theory of patents because it ensures that
(1) the applicant’s disclosure sufficiently enriches the public storehouse of
knowledge in exchange for the exclusionary right;19 and (2) the public will
get complete possession of the invention at the end of the patent term.20  So
when an invention is inadequately disclosed, the quid pro quo failed—the
original patentee received a patent yet the public was deprived of an ena-
bling disclosure.
Unfortunately, current novelty rules render an invention that was
nonenabled in a prior patent unpatentable by a subsequent inventor who
tries to claim it, even if the subsequent inventor has figured out how to make
and use it.21  This is true even though noncompliance with the enablement
requirement is a persistent problem in patent law.22  Policing enablement,
13 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147–48 (1989); Gra-
ham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966).
14 Novelty is the statutory requirement that an invention be new. See 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent . . . .” (emphasis added)).  For a detailed
discussion of novelty, see infra Section III.A.
15 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 305 (1890).
16 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVEN-
TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 292, at 394 (2d ed. 1854).
17 The PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the reasonably pru-
dent person in torts. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (explaining that a PHOSITA is “not unlike the ‘reasonable man’ and other
ghosts in the law”).  Factors relevant to constructing the PHOSITA in a particular technical
field include the sophistication of the technology, the educational level of the inventor, the
educational level of active workers in the field, the types of problems encountered in the
art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the rapidity with which innovations are
made.  Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
18 See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a); infra Section I.B.
19 Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195–96
(Fed. Cir. 1999).  For a discussion of the public storehouse of knowledge, see infra subsec-
tion I.A.2.
20 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. R
21 See infra Section III.A.
22 See infra subsection I.B.2.
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admittedly, is no easy task; rejecting a patent claim for nonenablement might
be the most formidable task that a patent examiner can undertake.23  It is no
secret that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“Patent Office”) routinely
issues patents with nonenabled claims.24  And when one considers the uni-
verse of millions of expired patents,25 there is every reason to believe that
some of them—perhaps many of them—contain nonenabled claims.  Partic-
ularly suspect are patents emerging from fields like chemistry, biotechnology,
and pharmaceuticals where a single patent claim can easily cover a large
number of compounds.
This Article draws attention to a situation where a subsequent inven-
tor—the reinventor—seeks to claim subject matter identical to that claimed by
a third party in an expired patent.  Under current patent law, the expired
patent presumably issued with enabled claims.26  I argue that if the
reinventor can prove that the earlier claim to the subject matter was nonen-
abled (and thus invalid when the original patent issued),27 the reinventor
should be allowed to claim the identical subject matter in a new patent.28
To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical.  Suppose that pharma-
ceutical company AcmePharma seeks to obtain a patent on a promising com-
pound, X—a fibrate that effectively lowers cholesterol in humans.29  At the
time that AcmePharma files its patent application in 2015, X is, as far as
AcmePharma knows, previously unknown.  But when the patent examiner
searches the “prior art” (preexisting knowledge and technology already avail-
able to the public)30 to assess novelty,31 the examiner finds an expired drug
patent filed in 1980 that listed X by name and structure and claimed it along
23 See infra Section I.B.
24 For commentary on the problem, see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT
FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 66–67 (2008);
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 839, 848–49 (1990).
25 An expired patent is one whose term of exclusivity has run.  Inventions covered by
an expired patent have become public property—at least in theory.  Pennock v. Dialogue,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 13 (1829).  As of 2015, the Patent Office has granted just under nine
million utility patents (covering electrical, mechanical, and chemical inventions) since
1836. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TABLE OF ISSUE YEARS AND PATENT NUMBERS, FOR
SELECTED DOCUMENT TYPES ISSUED SINCE 1836 (Feb. 18. 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/issuyear.htm.
26 See infra subsection I.B.2.
27 Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014); MagSil
Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
28 See infra Part III.
29 A fibrate is “[a]ny of a class of carboxylic acid compounds commonly used as lipid-
lowering medications . . . that primarily reduce levels of triglycerides” and “have a minor
impact on low-density and high-density lipoprotein cholesterol.” TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MED-
ICAL DICTIONARY 923 (Donald Venes ed., 22d ed. 2013).
30 Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (defining prior art)).  Documents
like issued patents and printed publications are common sources of prior art.  See 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (2012) (setting forth the documents and activities that can serve as prior art).
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with ninety-nine other compounds.  But the original patentee’s disclosure
merely speculated about X’s effectiveness as a drug32 and offered no details
about how to make X.  But this inadequate disclosure of X was of no import
to the original patentee who made a business decision not to pursue X—
perhaps because it would be too costly to develop or another claimed com-
pound proved to be safe, effective, and profitable.33  Yet while X was dis-
carded by the original patentee, the Patent Office did not give X much (if
any) scrutiny during the original examination, thereby allowing the nonen-
abled compound to slip through the cracks34 and to be covered by a pre-
sumptively valid (now expired) patent.35  Importantly, X has never been
commercialized; and other than the expired patent, no mention of X
appears in the technical literature.  Simply put, X was not invented until
AcmePharma came along.36
Nonetheless, two major hurdles prevent the reinventor from obtaining a
patent for X, even if the reinventor can actually develop and commercialize
it.37  First, the same invention cannot be claimed again in a later patent.38
This double-patenting prohibition rests on the presumption that the original
patent issued with valid (and thus enabled) claims.  Second, the Patent
Office can reject AcmePharma’s claim to X for a lack of novelty despite its
inadequate disclosure in the expired patent.39
31 See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.  Determining novelty requires a com- R
parison of the invention that the applicant seeks to patent with the prior art. In re Crucif-
erous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
32 A patent applicant must assert a utility for each claimed invention.  35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Patent Office must presume that the asserted utility is correct unless it can prove
otherwise. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
33 See infra note 140 and accompanying text. R
34 For a discussion of why this happens, and particularly when the issue is enablement,
see infra subsection III.D.1.
35 See infra Section II.C (discussing the presumption of patent validity).
36 The inventive process requires two acts—conception and reduction to practice.
ROBINSON, supra note 15, at 26.  In the chemical arts, conception requires knowledge of R
both the compound’s chemical structure and an operative method of making it.  Amgen,
Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  Reduction to practice
occurs when the inventor either makes the invention and establishes that it works for its
intended purpose or files a patent application that describes the invention in sufficient
detail to satisfy the “how to make” prong of enablement. In re Borst, 345 F.2d 851, 855
(C.C.P.A. 1965).  The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was a five-judge Article III
appellate court.  The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the C.C.P.A. See
Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
The Federal Circuit adopted C.C.P.A. decisional law as binding precedent. See South
Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
37 See infra Section III.A.
38 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. R
39 See supra note 25.  The novelty requirement safeguards the public domain by deny- R
ing a patent for identical subject matter that the public already possesses. See infra note 80, R
195 and accompanying text. R
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To qualify as novelty-defeating prior art, the expired patent must satisfy
three conditions.40  First, it must predate the reinventor’s filing date.41  Sec-
ond, the subject matter that the reinventor seeks to patent (X) must be iden-
tical to that disclosed in the prior patent (the “strict identity” requirement).42
Third, and very importantly, the asserted prior art reference must be ena-
bling.43  This means that as of the reinventor’s filing date, a PHOSITA could
have combined the teachings of the expired patent with preexisting knowl-
edge in the field to make X without undue experimentation.44  If the expired
patent meets all three criteria, it “anticipates” the reinventor’s claim and ren-
ders it unpatentable for a lack of novelty because X is considered to be in the
public’s possession.45  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit46
has held that, for the sake of expediency, the examiner is allowed to presume
that prior art references are enabling.47
Thus, the reinventor’s patentability hurdles are tied to enablement—a
presumption that the expired patent issued with enabled claims and a pre-
sumption that the expired patent has an enabling disclosure.  But the latter
completely subsumes the former—if X is not enabled later in time when the
reinventor files, it was not enabled earlier in time when claimed in the origi-
nal patent.48  Thus, I argue that if the reinventor can prove that the expired
patent was nonenabling for prior art purposes, that proof rebuts both pre-
sumptions.  The double-patenting problem disappears because the original,
nonenabled patent was technically invalid.49  The novelty problem disap-
40 Prior art is also used to gauge nonobviousness. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).  For
discussion of the role of nonobviousness in the reinvention paradigm, see infra Section
III.C.
41 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (denying patentability if “the claimed invention was pat-
ented . . . before the effective filing date of the claimed invention”); id. § 102(a)(2) (deny-
ing patentability if “the claimed invention was described in a patent . . . [that] names
another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention”).
42 Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (not-
ing the “strict identity” test for novelty).
43 In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Elan Pharm.,
Inc. v. Mayo Found., 346 F.3d 1051, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“To serve as an anticipating
reference, the reference must enable that which it is asserted to anticipate.”).
44 In re Morsa, 713 F.3d 104, 108–09 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis
Pharm. Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also infra notes 199–201 and accom- R
panying text.
45 Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
46 The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals from the Patent Office and district
court cases arising under the patent laws.  The court was created by the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982. See supra note 36. R
47 See infra subsection III.B.1.c.
48 This is because the PHOSITA’s knowledge and skill evolve over time.  Timothy R.
Holbrook, Patent Disclosures and Time, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1459, 1486 (2016).  While what was
nonenabling earlier in time can become enabling later in time, what is nonenabled later in
time could not have been enabled earlier in time. See infra subsection III.B.2.
49 See supra note 27. R
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pears because a nonenabled reference does not qualify as anticipatory prior
art.50  Thus, AcmePharma can claim X in its own patent.51
The reinvention paradigm clearly aligns with broader goals of the patent
system.  A basic purpose of the patent system is to encourage investment in
the research, development, and commercialization of socially valuable inven-
tions that firms would not otherwise make.52  Indeed, the possibility of
reinvention—and ultimately securing a patent—might accelerate innovation
by leading firms to engage in socially-productive races to figure out how to
make and use the claimed-but-nonenabled subject matter contained in the
universe of expired patents.53  Returning to  AcmePharma, it has determined
X has value.  If the firm is willing to invest time and money to prove that the
original claim to X was nonenabled, AcmePharma will probably commercial-
ize it.  So reinvention would not only allow AcmePharma to recoup its
research and development (R&D) costs,54 but the public would finally get its
end of the patent bargain—an adequate disclosure of X (which would hope-
fully spur more innovative activity during the patent term55) and possession
of X when the patent expires.56  Yet if a patent is unavailable, AcmePharma
has little incentive to invest in the development of X.57  AcmePharma and
other firms may simply ignore X, thereby resulting in its ultimate loss to the
public (which, in the case of a drug, could be enormous).58  That the current
novelty rules can actually deprive the public of socially beneficial inventions
is cause for concern and merits attention.
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I explores the link between disclo-
sure and possession in patent law.  It explains that if X was inadequately dis-
closed in the original patent, the original patentee never possessed it; thus,
50 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
CURTIS, supra note 16, § 292, at 395 (noting that if the description in the allegedly anticipa- R
tory reference is nonenabling, “it cannot be said that a knowledge of that thing is in the
possession of the public”).
51 See infra subsection III.B.2.
52 FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM: STUDY OF THE SUB-
COMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, S. DOC. NO. 85-15, at 36 (1958); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent
Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 247 (1994).
53 John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 443
(2004); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031,
1062 (2005).  “A patent race is a race among competing firms to be the first to discover and
patent some new idea having commercial potential.” WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 300 (2003).
54 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 53, at 294.
55 See infra note 61 and accompanying text. R
56 See infra note 91 and accompanying text. R
57 For a discussion of the incentives for pharmaceutical companies to engage in costly
drug development, see sources cited infra note 325.  As a general matter, “individuals will R
not generally invest in invention or creation unless the expected return from doing so
exceeds the cost of doing so—that is, unless they can reasonably expect to make a profit
from the endeavor.”  Lemley, supra note 53, at 1054. R
58 See infra Section III.D.
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the public never gained possession of X when the original patent expired.
Part II draws attention to squandered patent claims, which are a direct result
of inadequate disclosure in the original patent.  It explains how squandered
subject matter is essentially lost unless and until it is reinvented.  This Part
explores why squandered claims proliferate in patent law, the challenges in
solving the problem, and the consequences for the patent system.  Finally,
Part III proposes the reinvention paradigm.  It begins by describing how the
current novelty rules can defeat a later claim to X even though it was inade-
quately disclosed in the earlier patent.  This Part then explores the theoreti-
cal underpinnings, mechanics, and normative justification for the
reinvention paradigm and explains how it would solve the squandering prob-
lem.  After discussing limits and responding to potential criticisms, this Part
concludes by discussing how reinvention aligns with broader policy goals of
the patent system.
I. DISCLOSURE AND POSSESSION IN PATENT LAW
An oft-touted justification for the patent system is that society will get
some benefit from the invention’s disclosure.59  In theory, the statutory dis-
closure requirements60 ensure that the public can use the technical details
disclosed in the patent document to improve upon the invention, to design
around it, or to engage in other innovative activities during the patent term61
and gain full possession of it at the end of the patent term.62  This Part
explores the intricate link between disclosure and possession and the costs to
the public and the patent system when the disclosure function fails.
59 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that the
federal government “is willing to pay the high price” of exclusivity conferred by a patent
for its disclosure, which, “it is assumed, will stimulate ideas and the eventual development
of further significant advances in the art”).
60 The patent statute sets forth three disclosure requirements:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor . . . of carrying out the invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
61 As Judge Giles Rich once explained, “even if [the invention] does not go into the
public domain during the patent term, the public gets the advantage of knowing what the
invention is and how to practice it.”  Janice M. Mueller, A Rich Legacy, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 895, 900 (1999) (quoting E-mail from Giles S. Rich, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, to Janice M. Mueller, Assoc. Professor, John Marshall Law
Sch. (Aug. 16, 1997)).
62 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. R
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A. Patents and Knowledge Transfer
Fostering innovation through information dissemination is a basic goal
of the patent system.63  The exclusory right conferred by the patent is the
inventor’s reward for fully disclosing technical information about the inven-
tion.64  This Section explains how the inventor’s disclosure is the key benefit
that the public receives from the patent bargain.
1. The Quid Pro Quo Theory of Patents
A fundamental goal of the patent system is to encourage the dissemina-
tion of technical knowledge.65  As soon as a patent document publishes,
there is hope that the public will use the technical details disclosed therein to
improve upon the invention, design around it, or simply learn from it.66
Although the patentee maintains the right to “exclude others from practicing
the invention until the patent term expires, the technical information dis-
closed in the patent document has potential immediate value to the public,
which can use the information for any purpose that does not infringe upon
the claims.”67  This supports the patent system’s broader mission to promote
scientific progress and extend knowledge.68
Perhaps the most basic strategy for promoting disclosure is to give the
inventor something in return—a quid pro quo.  The inventor’s incentive for
full disclosure of the invention is the limited period of exclusionary rights
provided by the patent,69 which allows the inventor to recoup R&D expendi-
63 Patent law “seeks to foster and reward invention” with the hope that the disclosure
will “stimulate further innovation and . . . permit the public to practice the invention once
the patent expires.”  Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
64 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (describing a patent as “a
reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge”); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 1, 19 (1829) (recognizing that the patent system seeks to promote the progress of the
useful arts and to reward inventors).
65 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966).
66 MICHAEL A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIES FOR A
DYNAMIC WORLD 15–19 (2008).
67 Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 624
(2010) (footnote omitted) (citing Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd. [2004]
UKHL 46, [2005] R.P.C. 9 ¶ 77 (appeal taken from Eng.)); see also supra note 61. R
68 This goal emanates from the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution: “To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243
U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (observing that “the primary purpose of our patent laws . . . is ‘to
promote the progress of science and useful arts’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
69 See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001)
(“The disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.’”
(quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974))); Kewanee Oil Co., 416
U.S. at 480–81 (describing the quid pro quo that supports the patent grant as a constitu-
tional objective).
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tures.70  The public benefits from the exchange by obtaining valuable techni-
cal information about the invention, which can be used to make
improvements to the invention, design around it, or spur the development of
new technologies.71  This paradigm not only discourages trade secrecy,72 but
provides technical information about “non-self-disclosing” inventions like
complex chemical compounds or industrial processes—things that a
PHOSITA cannot easy replicate or reverse engineer.73  Thus, the quid pro
quo promotes the disclosure of information that the public might not other-
wise get.74
2. What Is the Public Storehouse of Technical Knowledge?
The inventive act produces two things that are potentially useful to the
public: the invention itself, which will be defined here as the subject matter
claimed in the patent (i.e., machine, product, process, composition of mat-
ter),75 and the disclosure, which furnishes technical details about the inven-
tion (i.e., how to make it, how to use it)76 and becomes a part of the
technical literature.  Though the claimed invention is probably the first thing
that comes to mind when patents are discussed, the importance of the disclo-
sure cannot be overlooked.77
The disclosed information enters what patent law calls the public store-
house of technical knowledge.78  The courts have stated that the disclosure
must actually enrich the public storehouse;79 meaning that a patent cannot
70 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 53, at 294. R
71 See infra subsection I.A.2.
72 See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120
YALE L.J. 1590, 1622 (2011) (“[T]rade secrecy protection can theoretically provide even
more powerful incentives than patents because trade secrecy rights are potentially infinite
in duration.”); J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 923–27
(2011) (exploring the patent versus trade secret distinction).
73 Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bar-
gain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 83.  For such inventions, “the disclosure of the invention in the
patent [document] is valuable to society . . . because it adds something the inventor could
have kept secret to the store of public technical knowledge.” Id. at 105–06.
74 EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A
STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 143 (2002).
75 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining patent-eligible subject matter).
76 See supra note 60. R
77 The Supreme Court has stated that “the ultimate goal of the patent system is to
bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through disclosure.”  Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
78 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that
when the information disclosed in a patent becomes publicly available it adds to the “gen-
eral store of knowledge”); In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin,
J., concurring) (noting that the full disclosure of how to make and use the invention “adds
a measure of worthwhile knowledge to the public storehouse”).
79 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Innovation, advancement, and
things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system
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issue if the disclosure is not new80 or is a trivial extension of what is already
present.81  In addition, a patent can neither remove extant knowledge from
the public storehouse nor limit free access to it.82
It is often forgotten that the inventive process furnishes technical infor-
mation to the public storehouse not at the end of the patent term, but as
soon as a patent document publishes.83  Patent theory contemplates that the
early entry reduces R&D waste,84 spurs creativity,85 leads others “to climb
onto the patentee’s shoulders in seeking improvements or wholly new inven-
tions,”86 and, of course, promotes technological progress.87
B. The Primacy of Enablement
Enablement is the patentability requirement that “lies at the heart of the
patent bargain.”88  By compelling an applicant to prepare a written descrip-
which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’” (altera-
tion in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
80 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998) (noting that section 102
“exclud[es] ideas that are in the public domain from patent protection”); Bonito Boats, 489
U.S. at 148 (explaining that granting a patent for an invention that lacks novelty “injure[s]
the public by removing existing knowledge from public use”).
81 See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453–54 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (defining “prior art” as “knowledge that is available, including what would be obvious
from it, at a given time, to a [PHOSITA]” (emphasis added)).  Sometimes an inventor can
obtain a patent for seemingly obvious inventions, such as when it exhibits an unexpected
property. See In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 386–87 (C.C.P.A. 1963); see also Graham, 383 U.S.
at 17–18 (discussing objective indicia of nonobviousness).
82 Graham, 383 U.S. at 6; see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262
(1979) (“[T]he stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in
the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.”).
83 Patent documents include issued patents and published patent applications.  Since
1999, most patent applications publish eighteen months after the earliest effective filing
date.  35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2012).  Once a patent application publishes, the informa-
tion it discloses is considered known to the public. See id. § 102.
84 Dam, supra note 52, at 267 n.79. R
85 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); GOLLIN, supra note
66, at 15–19. R
86 Dam, supra note 52, at 264; cf. Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 393, 400 (1960) (“The literature of the art is enriched, another way of doing some-
thing is made known and even if it be inferior to the means already known, there is no
telling when it may give another inventor an idea or when someone will improve on it in
such a way as to surpass all that is known.”).
87 Rich, supra note 86, at 400 (“Whenever novel subject matter, unobvious to the work-
ers of ordinary skill in an art, is published, progress in the art is promoted.”).
88 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABIL-
ITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 7.01, at 7-9 (2010); cf. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res.
Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing enablement as the
essential aspect of the patent bargain).
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tion of the invention89 sufficient to teach a PHOSITA how to make and use it
without undue experimentation,90 enablement ensures that the applicant’s
disclosure sufficiently enriches the public storehouse of technical knowledge
and that the public will get complete possession of the invention once the
patent expires.91  It polices claim scope92 and safeguards patent law’s disclo-
sure function.93
1. The Disclosure Standard
Enablement is a standard.94  Determining whether a disclosure in an
expired patent is enabling is a legal conclusion that rests on underlying fac-
tual inquiries.95  The Federal Circuit set forth several factors relevant to the
enablement analysis in In re Wands.96  They are: (1) the amount of direction
or guidance presented in the disclosure; (2) the existence of working exam-
ples; (3) the nature of the invention; (4) the predictability or unpredictability
of the art; (5) the PHOSITA’s level of skill; (6) the state of the prior art; (7)
the breadth of the claims; and (8) the quantity of experimentation necessary
to practice the claimed invention.97  While not mandatory,98 the Wands fac-
tors are ubiquitous in evaluating enablement99—probably because they
touch on issues that are important in virtually all enablement determina-
89 The written description is the part of the patent document that completely
describes the invention.  35 U.S.C. § 112(a)–(b) (2012).  “Disclosure” and “specification”
are also used to refer to the written description.
90 Id. § 112(a).  Although “[t]he term ‘undue experimentation’ does not appear in
the statute . . . it is well established that enablement requires that the [patent document]
teach those in the art to make and use the invention without undue experimentation.” In
re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
91 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. R
92 Claim scope is the “technological territory” that the inventor claims to control.
Merges & Nelson, supra note 24, at 844.  The enablement provided serves as a constraint R
on claim scope.  Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d
1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
93 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETI-
TION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4, at 3–4 (2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT], https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-
competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf (explaining that enablement
plays a central role in “safeguard[ing] the patent system’s disclosure function by ensuring
relatively swift dissemination of technical information from which others . . . can learn”).
94 See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576–77
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA
L. REV. 127, 130 (2008).
95 Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999–1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
96 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
97 Id. (factors reordered from original text).
98 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting
that the Wands factors are illustrative and not mandatory).
99 See CHISUM, supra note 88, § 7.03, at 7-15–7-16 (collecting cases). R
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tions.100  These include issues related to the technical scope and substance of
the disclosure (factors one and two),101 the nature of the technology (factors
three and four),102 the PHOSITA’s knowledge and skill (factor five),103 and
the scope of the claim sought (factor seven).104
Gauging compliance with the enablement requirement is easiest when
the applicant actually makes the invention before filing and discloses the
technical details in the patent application.105  But unlike mainstream sci-
ence, which requires a description of every experimental detail of work actu-
ally performed as a prerequisite for publication,106 an applicant can obtain a
patent with no (or very little) actual proof of concept or pre-filing experi-
mentation.107  Indeed, the patent system values the concept more than physi-
cal activity108 and “explicitly assumes the need for more experimentation
after filing to actually implement the invention.”109
100 The factors are interrelated.  For example, if the PHOSITA is really smart (factor
five), an applicant need not disclose what the PHOSITA can easily figure out (factors one
and two). See Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
101 The two factors are clustered together because working examples are a form of
guidance.  Seymore, supra note 67, at 641–46. R
102 One way to determine the requisite amount of teaching is to ask whether the tech-
nology is “unpredictable” or “predictable.”  The courts refer to chemistry, biotechnology,
and related experimental fields as “unpredictable” because PHOSITAs in these fields often
cannot predict whether a reaction protocol that works for one embodiment will work for
others.  Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg, Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 11, 1997).  Applied technologies like electrical and mechanical engineering are often
regarded as “predictable” arts because they are rooted in well-defined, predictable factors.
In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  For a deeper exploration of the predict-
able-unpredictable dichotomy, see Seymore, supra note 94, at 136–39. R
103 This factor is receiving more attention from the courts. See, e.g., ALZA Corp. v.
Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 941–42 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that the district court
properly determined the PHOSITA’s level of skill and did not err in giving less weight to a
witness who analyzed an issue using the wrong level of skill).
104 Enablement places an outer limit on claim scope. See supra note 92. R
105 Cf. Seymore, supra note 67, at 652–53 (advocating a working example requirement R
for complex technologies that would, among other things, simplify the enablement
analysis).
106 See Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and Bio-
technology’s Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109, 114
(2011) (“[A] scientific publication typically has to describe an actually completed experi-
ment, while a patent specification does not.”).
107 See In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 461 (C.C.P.A. 1956) (“The mere fact that some-
thing has not previously been done clearly is not, in itself, a sufficient basis for rejecting all
applications purporting to disclose how to do it.”); Karschtedt, supra note 106, at 114.
108 Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1998).
109 Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65,
93 (2009) (emphasis added) (citing Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 545 F.3d
1312, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).  For a critique of this approach, see Mark A. Lemley,
Ready for Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1172–74 (2016).
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2. Technical Complexities
Inventions disclosed in a patent application, including those not physi-
cally made at the time the application was filed, enjoy a presumption of
enablement.110  This means that an examiner who doubts enablement must
build a prima facie case of nonenablement, which must be supported with
documentary evidence.111  The applicant can rebut the prima facie case with
persuasive argument or proof.112  The burden of production may continue
to shift as each side presents new evidence;113 however, the examiner carries
the ultimate burden of persuasion with a preponderance of the evidence as
the standard of proof.114
While this presumption might not be a cause for concern for simple
inventions like paper clips or chopsticks,115 it becomes more dubious for
more complex inventions like chemical compounds and sophisticated
devices.116  An enabling disclosure is crucial for complex inventions because
the PHOSITA must rely heavily, if not exclusively, on the instruction pro-
vided within the four corners of the patent document in order to practice the
invention.117  However, all too often the examiner lacks the time, incentive,
or facilities to adequately evaluate enablement.118  It is also very hard to
prove that something cannot be done.119  This means that the examiner must
often accept any assertions made by the applicant that cannot be disproved
by promptly identifiable documentary evidence.120
110 In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223
(C.C.P.A. 1971).
111 See Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 224; see also In re Brebner, 455 F.2d 1402, 1405 (C.C.P.A.
1972) (holding that the Patent Office must provide a factual basis for a lack of enablement
rejection rather than conclusory statements).
112 In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
113 When the applicant submits rebuttal evidence, the examiner must “start over” and
“consider all of the evidence anew.” Id. at 1472 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
114 In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
115 See Seymore, supra note 67, at 644 (arguing that a PHOSITA can make simple inven- R
tions with a minimal amount of teaching from the inventor).
116 See id. at 644–45.
117 Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1528 (2011).  Thus, the
lack of a detailed teaching means that a PHOSITA will probably need to engage in undue
experimentation to practice the full scope of the invention. Id. at 1530.
118 Examiner incentives are complicated; certain application-related activities “count”
more for production goals, promotion, and bonus decisions than others.  Mark A. Lemley
& Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT.
817, 818 (2012).
119 Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156 SCIENCE 763,
764 (1967).
120 FTC REPORT, supra note 93, ch. 5, at 9; cf. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtron- R
ics, Inc., 439 F.2d 1369, 1378–79 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that in the absence of its own
testing facilities, the Patent Office must rely on information presented to it).
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So it is not surprising that nonenabled patents slip through the cracks.
And while some enablement defects are innocent,121 savvy patentees take
advantage of the presumption and strategically draft claims that deliberately
cover undeveloped or underdeveloped subject matter.122  Regardless, it is
hard to overstate that these nonenabled patents create problems and frus-
trate many important goals of the patent system.  They contribute to the well-
known patent quality problem,123 add little or nothing to the public store-
house of knowledge,124 supply little technical fodder for follow-on research-
ers to build upon,125 and create roadblocks for subsequent inventors who
can enable the claimed subject matter.126
C. Evincing Possession
The enablement requirement of section 112(a) of the Patent Act com-
pels the inventor to disclose in writing how to make and use the claimed
subject matter.127  The claim scope sought dictates how much information
the inventor must disclose.128  Society must pay for this information; it does
so with the twenty years of exclusory rights conferred by the patent grant.129
Providing a full, enabling disclosure at the application stage confers two
benefits to society that can be described in terms of possession.  First, the
public gains immediate possession of the technical information disclosed in
the patent document upon publication and can use it for any purpose that
does not infringe upon the claims.130  Second, the public gains possession of
the invention itself at the end of the patent term.131  When a nonenabled
patent issues, however, the public might be deprived of both.132
121 For instance, so-called “nuisance” prior art describing an unworkable invention
“can . . . be generated as a result of a bona fide attempt at a constructive reduction to
practice that for some unexpected reason fails to work as disclosed.”  David S. Wainwright,
Patenting Around Nuisance Prior Art, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 221, 223–24 (1999).
Innocuously disclosed information has the same effect. See id. at 222, 223 n.3.
122 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 24, at 67. R
123 See infra subsection III.D.1.
124 See supra subsection I.A.2.
125 In other words, the disclosure lacks sufficient technical detail to be helpful.  It does
little to advance technological progress, which the Constitution requires.  Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
126 See Seymore, supra note 67, at 660. R
127 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
128 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. R
129 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974); Jason Rantanen,
Patent Law’s Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 379 (2013).
130 Seymore, supra note 67, at 624. R
131 See supra notes 11, 20 and accompanying text. R
132 Recall in the reinvention paradigm, there has been no intervening disclosure, com-
mercialization, or interest in the subject matter between the time of the expired patent
and the reinventor’s patent application.  So any benefit to the public will come from
reinvention. See supra text accompanying notes 36–39.  But one can imagine a scenario R
where the public might (eventually) gain possession of the nonenabled subject matter
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So how does an inventor show complete possession of an invention in a
patent document?  According to the Federal Circuit, “a recitation of how to
make and use the invention across the full breadth of the claim is ordinarily
sufficient to demonstrate that the inventor possesses the full scope of the
invention.”133  Thus, the question of possession is really one of
enablement.134
What makes possession challenging is that the invention is not necessa-
rily a particular embodiment but more of an intangible idea.135  And the
inventor is required to fully disclose the intangible idea in the patent docu-
ment.  Demonstrating the possession of an intangible idea is difficult because
one can describe an idea but not necessarily possess it.136  A good example is
an idea about reversing the hands of time by controlling the aging process in
humans.  An idea about how to control the aging process does not mean that
a patent applicant possesses a method of doing it.137  As Timothy Holbrook
explains, “[T]he key aspect of possession is whether or not the [researcher]
can actually make a functioning device.  Thus, the best evidence of posses-
sion would be either the inventor physically creating the invention or, at
least, providing a description that is clear enough to enable someone else to
build it.”138
Thus, enablement limits permissible claim scope to what the inventor
actually invented and taught, even if the inventor tries to claim far more
broadly.139
because the PHOSITA’s knowledge and skill evolves over time, allowing the invention to
be practiced without undue experimentation. See supra note 48. R
133 LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
134 It is important to note that another disclosure requirement also implicates posses-
sion.  The “written description” requirement of section 112(a) compels the applicant to
“convey with reasonable clarity to [a PHOSITA] that, as of the filing date sought, he or she
was in possession of the invention.”  Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).  In the chemical context, the question is whether the compound at issue was
specifically disclosed by name or chemical structure.  Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171
(Fed. Cir. 1993).  Since X is specifically described in the expired patent, the written
description requirement is met.
135 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 S.M.U. L. REV. 123, 146
(2006).
136 Id.
137 In In re Eltgroth, the applicant claimed a method of influencing the age of a living
organism by modifying the abundance of chemical isotopes in the bloodstream through
the addition of certain chemical compounds. In re Eltgroth, 419 F.2d 918, 918–19
(C.C.P.A. 1970).  The C.C.P.A. upheld a nonenablement rejection because the applicant’s
written description failed to disclose any details regarding specific isotopes and how to
alter their abundance. Id. at 921.  Rather, the disclosure was simply “a speculative theory
or hypothesis” requiring undue experimentation to make it work. Id.
138 Holbrook, supra note 135, at 147. R
139 Rantanen, supra note 129, at 374.  The Federal Circuit has also held that a patent R
claim cannot be construed to literally cover later-developed technologies that were not
enabled at the time the patent application was filed. See Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb
Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1339–42 (Fed. Cir. 2003); cf. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech,
Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1262–63 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Bryson, J., concurring) (explaining that
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II. THE PROLIFERATION OF “SQUANDERED” PATENT CLAIMS
The lax enforcement of the enablement requirement can lead to much
mischief in patent law.  Many problems can be tied to the proliferation of
what I call squandered claims.  After defining the term, this Part explores the
proliferation of squandered claims and their negative impact on the patent
system.  It also shows that much subject matter that a reinventor would seek
to claim was squandered in an earlier, expired patent.
A. The Breadth of the Problem
When one considers the universe of millions of expired patents, there is
probably an incalculable amount of claimed-but-nonenabled subject matter.
Most of this subject matter was discarded by the original patentee—perhaps
because it would be too costly to develop or other claimed embodiments
proved to be more promising or profitable.140  And there has been no subse-
quent commercialization, use, or disclosure of it in the technical literature.
It is as if the claimed-but-nonenabled subject matter never existed.141  But
since the current novelty rules prevent it from being claimed again, it has
been squandered.  No one can derive a benefit from claimed-but-nonenabled
subject matter unless and until it is (re)invented.
Squandering can occur in any patent; however, it is particularly prob-
lematic in chemical and pharmaceutical patents because of the way that
chemical moieties are typically described and claimed.  The claims may
encompass hundreds, thousands, even millions of potential compounds, “the
vast majority of which have never been synthesized or tested and whose very
existence may only be theoretical.”142  And to the extent that some of the
claimed compounds are nonenabled, the stage is set for squandering.
To illustrate, I will build on the hypothetical introduced earlier.143  Con-
sider a drug company that finds that two closely related compounds show
promising pharmacological activity.  It files a patent application in 1980 that
does not merely disclose and claim the two compounds actually tested;144
rather it discloses and claims the entire class of 100 compounds by name and
claims cannot be construed “broadly enough to encompass technology that is not devel-
oped until later and was not enabled by the original application”). Id. at 1262.
140 This is not unexpected. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
577, 603 (1999) (stating most patented technologies “will not be economically viable or
commercially successful”).  The original patentee might have claimed broadly to “hedge
[its] bets” if it was uncertain about which claimed subject matter was likely to prove valua-
ble.  Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1505
(2001).
141 See supra note 36. R
142 TONY ELLERY & NEAL HANSEN, PHARMACEUTICAL LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT: MAKING
THE MOST OF EACH AND EVERY BRAND 96–97 (2012).
143 See supra text accompanying notes 29–36. R
144 For an explanation, see infra text accompanying note 171. R
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structure.  The compounds share a core structure; they differ in the number
and identities of chemical functional groups.145
The question is whether the ninety-eight unmade compounds have been
squandered.  To answer this question, suppose the now-expired patent is sub-
jected to an enablement analysis.  The question is whether all 100 were ena-
bled as of the reinventor’s filing date.  After construing the claim, assessing
the PHOSITA’s level of skill, and evaluating the teaching provided in the
patent document, the decisionmaker determines it enabled a PHOSITA to
practice ten compounds, not 100.  Support for the nonenablement determina-
tion is based on the finding that:
[R]eplacing a functional group on a chemical compound can often have
highly unpredictable results. . . . [E]ven a change as seemingly trivial as
replacing an isopropyl group with the isosteric cyclopropyl group . . . could
result in either a significant improvement or reduction in the activity of the
compound against a particular biological target.146
The point here is that a PHOSITA could not extrapolate a result from
the two compounds actually made across all 100 compounds claimed with a
reasonable expectation of success.147  Thus, a PHOSITA would have had to
engage in undue experimentation to practice its full scope.
The inadequate disclosure in the now-expired patent is costly for the
patent system and the public.  Even if none of the ninety claimed-but-nonen-
abled compounds has been commercialized or disclosed in the technical
literature, their prior disclosure in the earlier patent defeats novelty and pre-
vents them from being patented again.148  This is true even though the
145 A functional group is “[a]n atom or group of atoms within a molecule that shows a
characteristic set of physical and chemical properties.” WILLIAM H. BROWN ET AL., ORGANIC
CHEMISTRY G-4 (6th ed. 2012).  A functional group represents a potential reaction site in a
compound, and thus determines a compound’s chemical reactivity. RICHARD C. LAROCK,
COMPREHENSIVE ORGANIC TRANSFORMATIONS: A GUIDE TO FUNCTIONAL GROUP PREPARATIONS
(2d ed. 1999).
146 Singh v. Brake, 317 F.3d 1334, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
147 In chemistry, results are often unpredictable because researchers often must engage
in trial and error to figure out what works and what does not.  Thus, a PHOSITA cannot
predict if a reaction protocol that works for one compound will work for others. See supra
note 102; see also In re Prutton, 200 F.2d 706, 712 (C.C.P.A. 1952) (holding that claims to a R
class of chemical compounds, which were sufficiently broad to involve some speculation,
lacked enablement despite the presence of operative specific examples within the class).
148 Throughout this Article, I have drawn attention to a scenario where X is specifically
disclosed and claimed in the expired patent.  But one can imagine a scenario where X is
not specifically recited by name or structure but rather is disclosed (and claimed) as part of
a genus in a generic chemical formula.  It is true that sometimes a generic chemical
formula is disclosed so broadly that it is insufficient to anticipate a species. See, e.g., Atofina
v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“It is well established that
the disclosure of a genus in the prior art is not necessarily a disclosure of every species that
is a member of that genus.”); In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 974 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (determin-
ing that the disclosed genus did not anticipate everything within its scope because the
description of the genus would not lead a PHOSITA to a “small recognizable class with
common properties”).  If a PHOSITA can “at once envisage” the specific compound at
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ninety compounds never entered the public domain because of their inade-
quate disclosure in the earlier patent.149  Nonetheless, the current patent
laws provide little or no incentive for subsequent inventors to develop
them.150  Thus, the ninety claimed-but-nonenabled compounds have been
squandered.151  This outcome harms the public152 and frustrates basic goals
of the patent system.153
B. Mixed Signals from the Courts
Given that squandered claims are technically invalid for nonenablement,
one may wonder why they proliferate.  It would seem that the Patent Office
and the courts would demand a tight correspondence between the scope of
the enablement provided and the scope of the claim ultimately granted.
Indeed, there is a so-called “commensurability” requirement;154 however,
enforcing it is complicated.
Recall that enablement is a standard that affords the decisionmaker a
fair amount of discretion.155  Given that enablement is judged by the state of
the relevant technology and the PHOSITA’s knowledge and identity at a spe-
cific point in time, the analysis is inherently flexible—requiring a case-by-case
treatment of the relevant issues.156  A flexible, fact-sensitive enablement doc-
trine also allows patent law to accommodate different technologies, new tech-
nologies, and old technologies that evolve over time.157
But flexibility need not implicate the threshold for enablement, which
can be set uniformly high (or low) by the decisionmaker.  To be sure, the
issue within the generic chemical formula in the prior art reference, the compound is
anticipated. In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1962).  A PHOSITA must be able
to draw the structural formula or write the compound’s name. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2131.02 (9th ed. 2014) [hereinafter
MPEP] (citing In re Schaumann, 572 F.2d 312, 316–17 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).  Again, the
reinvention paradigm does not pose a Ruschig problem because X is specifically disclosed.
149 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. R
150 See infra note 178. R
151 See infra Section II.D.
152 See supra Section II.A (first paragraph).
153 See supra Part I.
154 Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195–96
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The enablement requirement ensures that the public knowledge is
enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of
the claims.”).
155 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.  A standard can be defined as a “legal R
directive” that “giv[es] the decisionmaker more discretion” by “collaps[ing] decisionmak-
ing back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situa-
tion,” thereby “allow[ing] the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the
totality of the circumstances.”  Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 58–59 (1992).
156 AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Wands, 858 F.2d
731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
157 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1191 (2002).
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threshold can be set sufficiently high to render any claim covering nonen-
abled subject matter invalid.  Although the Federal Circuit has not gone that
far, recently it has been touting a “full scope” enablement requirement;158
meaning that “[c]laims are not enabled when, at the effective filing date of
the patent, [a PHOSITA] could not practice their full scope without undue
experimentation.”159
Of course, full scope enablement and squandering are mutually exclu-
sive.  So one might think that a robust, full scope enablement requirement
would solve the squandering problem.160  But the story is not so simple.
There is an enablement subdoctrine—the inoperative embodiments doc-
trine161—which renders a claim not necessarily invalid if some of the subject
matter fails to work as described.162  The Federal Circuit has stated that the
patentee need not guarantee that everything claimed actually works.163  This
means that a patentee will not be limited to those embodiments specifically
exemplified in the patent document164 or shown to actually work for their
intended purpose.165
The inoperable embodiments doctrine is patentee-friendly.  The cases
make clear that the claims need not specifically exclude possible inoperative
158 See, e.g., Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
159 Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(emphasis added) (citing MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d
1377, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
160 Cf. James Farrand et al., “Reform” Arrives in Patent Enforcement: The Big Picture, 51
IDEA 357, 415–17 (2011) (describing the full scope enablement doctrine and noting that
it “can invalidate many existing broad patent claims, particularly if it continues to be
applied as broadly as it is being stated”). Id. at 417.
161 Although the doctrine has existed for quite some time, Jeffrey Lefstin named it the
“‘inoperative embodiments’ doctrine.” See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent
Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1178 (2008).
162 See In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1019
(C.C.P.A. 1964) (noting that the mere inclusion of inoperative embodiments in a claim
will not defeat patentability).  Only “if the number of inoperative [embodiments] becomes
significant, and in effect forces [a PHOSITA] to experiment unduly in order to practice
the claimed invention, the claims might indeed be invalid.”  Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1984); cf. In re Kamal, 398 F.2d
867, 871 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (“Whether a disclosure gives reasonable assurance that all of the
compounds embraced by the claims would be useful for the purposes intended must be
determined by the particular circumstances of each case, including the nature of the com-
pounds per se and the supporting disclosure.” (quoting In re Riat, 327 F.2d 685, 686
(C.C.P.A. 1964))).
163 Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 61 (1998)).
164 See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is well settled that patent
applicants are not required to disclose every species encompassed by their claims, even in
an unpredictable art.”); SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that the law does not require that an applicant describe every
conceivable embodiment of the invention).
165 Alcon Research Ltd., 745 F.3d at 1189.
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substances.166  And if the applicant had to demonstrate that everything
claimed actually worked, “the research to do this would quite evidently be
endless.”167  So the traditional evidentiary rules apply—namely, a presump-
tion in both the Patent Office and the courts that the full scope of a claim is
enabled.168  The burden rests with the party challenging enablement to
prove unpatentability or invalidity, respectively.169
Thus, the inoperative embodiments doctrine vitiates full scope enable-
ment.  Again, full scope enablement means that a PHOSITA should be able
to read the patent’s written description of the invention and—combined with
the PHOSITA’s own knowledge—make and use everything that is claimed.  So
if the patent covers 100 chemical compounds that purportedly have a specific
pharmacological activity, the PHOSITA should be enabled to make and use
each of them.  The inoperative embodiments doctrine, however, raises doubts
about this expectation.170
And while the doctrine essentially guarantees squandering (because it
allows for some inoperable embodiments in the scope of the claim), it finds
considerable support in patent law.  Robert Merges and Richard Nelson
argue that requiring a tighter connection between the disclosure and the
claims would lead to (narrow) patents of little value because an imitator
could find minor variations over the embodiments specifically exemplified or
actually reduced to practice.171  Thus, the doctrine seemingly adds value to
patent claims.172  Proponents would assert that it encourages early disclo-
166 Atlas Powder Co., 750 F.2d at 1576 (quoting In re Dinh-Nguyen, 492 F.2d 856, 858–59
(C.C.P.A. 1974) (emphasis omitted)).
167 In re Sarett, 327 F.2d at 1019.
168 See ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“Because patents are presumed valid, lack of enablement must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.”); In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (explaining the
presumption and placing the burden on the examiner to prove nonenablement).
169 See supra note 168; see also PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, R
1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that a patent was enabling because the challenger did not
prove that undue experimentation would be required to practice the undescribed
embodiments).
170 In unpredictable fields like chemistry, there is a real danger that claimed subject
matter not specifically exemplified or actually reduced to practice cannot be made or work
as intended. PPG Indus., Inc., 75 F.3d at 1564; Seymore, supra note 67, at 631–32. R
171 Merges & Nelson, supra note 24, at 845; see also Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., R
Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (arguing that narrow patent rights become
worthless as new modes of practicing the invention develop).
172 It is true that claims are of little value unless they can ensnare a potential infringer.
Patentees achieve this goal by obtaining broad claims that cover “all expected and unantici-
pated [variants] that competitors and others may later develop . . . which embody the
inventor’s concept.” ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING
§ 10:1.1 (6th ed. 2014).
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sure,173 gives the patentee an edge over competitors,174 and prevents patent
documents from becoming overly thick.175
C. Consequences
Consider again the incalculable number of claimed-but-nonenabled
compounds that exist in the universe of expired patents.  Assuming that they
were never commercialized and—other than the expired patent—have not
been described in the technical literature, these compounds have been
essentially lost.176  Nothing about them has entered the public storehouse of
knowledge,177 and the public has derived no benefit from them.  There
might be little or no economic incentive for others to research or develop
these compounds since they cannot be patented again.178  The expired pat-
ent creates roadblocks for other inventors,179 including the ability to domi-
nate other technological innovations that only subsequent workers in the
field can actually enable.180
173 See Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (quoting In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977)) (arguing that limiting
the scope of the claims to the specific embodiments disclosed is a poor way to stimulate
invention and discourages early disclosure).
174 See Edlyn S. Simmons, Prior Art Searching in the Preparation of Pharmaceutical Patent
Applications, 3 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 52, 52 (1998) (explaining the importance of draft-
ing broad generic claims that include hypothetical compounds in order to prevent com-
petitors from developing them).
175 See N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 941 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“It is
not fatal if some experimentation is needed, for the patent document is not intended to be
a production specification.”).
176 Cf. Seymore, supra note 67, at 656 (explaining that since many patentees do not R
disclose technical information about their inventions in another medium, much technical
information not disclosed through the patent system never enters the public storehouse of
knowledge and will likely be lost).
177 Id. at 666.
178 This is certainly the case for costly new drugs. See supra note 57 and accompanying R
text; infra note 325. R
179 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 24, at 67; see also Frank B. Killian & Co. v. Allied Latex R
Corp., 188 F.2d 940, 942 (2d Cir. 1951) (explaining that unknown and unexploited patents
stand on the same footing as other novelty-defeating prior art).
180 Seymore, supra note 67, at 660.  Another commentator elaborates on the scope and R
consequences of the problem:
The further a patent moves away from a requirement that the inventor actu-
ally have a complete and operative invention [at the time of filing], the broader
the patent’s scope and the greater potential that the [claims] will protect specula-
tive ideas . . . . With just a little time, money, and imagination, one may . . .
without inventing anything . . . [obtain a patent with] claims that are broad
enough to [encompass] technology developed for the first time years after the
inventor first files an application. . . . [This can have] an undue chilling effect on
the behavior of later scientists [and] researchers . . . who (sometimes many years
later) through their own experimentation, hard work, and trial and error succeed
in [creating] a bona fide product or process that actually works.
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Another roadblock is the presumption of patent validity.  When a patent
issues, it is presumed valid.181  This applies to everything claimed, including
each of the numerous compounds under discussion.  The rationale is that “a
government agency such as the . . . Patent Office [is] presumed to do its
job.”182  This allows the patentee to benefit from double deference—that the
patent application as filed presumptively complied with the statutory patenta-
bility requirements, including enablement (the presumption of enable-
ment),183 and that the Patent Office did its job to only issue valid patents
(the presumption of patent validity).184  This presumption creates a formida-
ble hurdle for challengers, who must prove that the contentious subject mat-
ter was nonenabled.185
The preceding discussion suggests two things.  First, from a patentee’s
perspective, there is little downside to squandering.186  Second, it is nearly
impossible for a subsequent inventor to patent previously claimed-but-nonen-
abled subject matter.
III. THE REINVENTION PARADIGM
In this Part, I propose the reinvention paradigm and explain how it
helps solve the squandering problem.  I focus on the quintessential reinven-
tion scenario discussed above—and specifically on the hypothetical set forth
in the Introduction—where a reinventor seeks to claim a chemical moiety, X,
Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A Novel “Cold Fusion”
Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 407, 453 (2007).
181 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
182 Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
accord K/S Himpp v. Hear-Wear Techs., LLC, 751 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The
assumption that PTO examiners will use their knowledge of the art when examining pat-
ents is the foundation for the presumption in 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) that issued patents are
valid.”).  Doug Lichtman and Mark Lemley posit a theoretical justification that “patent
examiners have expertise when it comes to questions of patent validity, and if patent exam-
iners have decided that a given invention qualifies for protection, judges and juries should
not second-guess the experts.”  Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s
Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 (2007).
183 See supra subsection I.B.2.
184 See supra notes 181–182 and accompanying text. R
185 In litigation, a challenger must prove invalidity with clear and convincing evidence.
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2251 (2011).  The America Invents Act
created several post-issuance, non-litigation-based mechanisms including inter partes
review (IPR), 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19, and post-grant review (PGR), id. §§ 321–29—trials con-
ducted by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.  In both proceedings the petitioner need
only prove patent invalidity by a preponderance of evidence. Id. § 316(e); § 326(e).  How-
ever, both mechanisms are quite limited.  For example, for both IPR and PGR, the petition
must be filed within nine months of patent issuance. Id. § 311(c); § 321(c).  For IPR, only
novelty and nonobviousness may be challenged. Id. § 311(b).
186 See GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE SCIENCE INDUS-
TRIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 46 (2d ed. 2009) (“Firms may deliberately file excessively
broad patent claims in the hope that at least some of these will slip through the examina-
tion system and be allowed.”).
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that was claimed but nonenabled (squandered) in an earlier, now expired
patent.187
A. Theoretical Underpinnings
The reinvention paradigm is founded on a straightforward theoretical
basis.  The universe of expired patents is full of squandered compounds like
X.  And since squandered subject matter was nonenabled,188 any claim to X
in an expired patent is technically invalid.189  The original inventor never
possessed X; thus, the public never gained possession of it at the end of the
patent term.190  And assuming that X has not been disclosed, used, or com-
mercialized, it is still unknown.  I contend that the new patent should be
granted if the reinventor can: (1) establish that the disclosure in the expired
patent did not enable X; and (2) satisfy enablement and the other patentabil-
ity requirements for X.
The key patentability hurdle that the reinventor must overcome is nov-
elty—the statutory requirement that X is new.191  If the identical subject mat-
ter has been “patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use,
on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of
the claimed invention,”192 it is anticipated by the prior disclosure and is
unpatentable.193  Novelty is a rigid rule—perhaps unduly so.194  The theoret-
ical basis for novelty rests on the assumption that the invention’s prior disclo-
sure gave the public access to it; thus, a patent is not required as an incentive
to invent.195  And if a patent is not needed as an inducement, the costs to the
187 See supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text. R
188 See supra Section II.A.
189 See supra note 27. R
190 See supra Section I.C.
191 “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis
added).
192 Id. § 102(a)(1).
193 The patent statute provides a grace period for certain prior disclosures that came
directly or indirectly from the inventor. See id. § 102(b).
194 The novelty rules protecting the public domain are
so solicitous of preserving access to the prior art that they can seem almost
absurd.  There is no inquiry into [ ] the practical accessibility of the prior art;
once it is public, even marginally, and only in one obscure place or one obscure
form, the game is over—no patent.  Period.
ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 143 (2011).
195 RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE
WORLD OF IDEAS 64 (2013); see also Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patenta-
bility, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 12–13 (1992) (“The logic behind [the novelty requirement] is
fairly straightforward . . . . [Because if] information is already in the public domain when
the ‘inventor’ seeks to patent it[,] society has no need to grant a patent to get this
information.”).
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public (who would no longer have free access to the invention) would out-
weigh any benefit of patent protection.196
At this point it is necessary to say more about enablement as it pertains
to prior art.  The Introduction discussed how the reinventor would have to
face two enablement hurdles.  Section 112(a) of the Patent Act compels a
patent applicant to submit a written description that enables a PHOSITA to
make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experi-
mentation.197  While a “statutory” or patent-supporting form of enablement
places an outer limit on claim scope,198 the form pertaining to prior art ref-
erences is referred to as “anticipatory” or patent-defeating enablement
because it is used to demonstrate that a PHOSITA could use preexisting
knowledge to make X without undue experimentation.199  Unlike the statu-
tory form, anticipatory enablement is a narrower doctrine because there is no
requirement that a prior art reference disclose how to use X.200  A prior art
reference need only enable a PHOSITA to make X and nothing more.201
Finally, if the expired patent is nonenabling, it does not qualify as prior
art.202  And to be clear, it is not that the expired patent has somehow lost its
status as prior art over time—it was never prior art because of the inadequate
(nonenabling) disclosure.203
196 CASS & HYLTON, supra note 195, at 64; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and R
Economics Agenda for the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2088 (2000) (“Granting pat-
ents on technologies that are not new would impose the social costs of monopolies without
the countervailing benefits of promoting development and introduction of welfare-
enhancing inventions.”).
197 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. R
198 See supra Section I.B.
199 Novo Nordisk Pharms., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2005); In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Such possession is effected if [a
PHOSITA] could have combined the publication’s description of the invention with his
own knowledge to make the claimed invention.”).  “Enablement” does not appear in the
text of section 102.  Thus, the doctrine is the result of a “judicially imposed limitation” on
section 102 that the description of the subject matter in the reference must be an enabling
description. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 939 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
200 Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“[S]ection 112 ‘provides that the specification must enable one skilled in the art to “use”
the invention whereas [section] 102 makes no such requirement as to an anticipatory dis-
closure.’” (quoting In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969))).
201 Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
202 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
203 In patent law, the courts recognize the “lost art” doctrine, which holds that prior
knowledge or use of an invention cannot anticipate a subsequent claim to the invention if
the details from the first invention have been completely lost.  Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10
How.) 477, 497–98 (1850) (applying the doctrine after determining that the first invention
had been completely forgotten and essentially abandoned).  The first invention does not
qualify as prior art because it is no longer accessible to the public. Id. at 497.  In contrast
to the reinvention paradigm, the “lost art” was or could have been prior art but no longer
qualifies because it is no longer publicly accessible. See ROBINSON, supra note 15, at 442
(“An invention, once in use, is considered as inaccessible to the public when it has been
abandoned and forgotten, and can no longer be completely known, by [a PHOSITA],
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B. A New Novelty Framework
Obtaining a reinvention patent for X would follow the typical patent
prosecution rubric.204  As I describe below, prosecution is driven by eviden-
tiary mechanisms that include presumptions and shifting burdens of proof.
1. Presumptions and Burdens of Proof
a. Overview
At the time of filing, the reinventor’s patent application presumably
complies with each of the statutory patentability requirements,205 including
novelty.206  Accordingly, the initial burden of proof rests with the examiner
to build a prima facie case of X’s unpatentability.207  Once made, the burden
shifts to the reinventor to rebut the prima facie case with persuasive argu-
ment or proof.208  While the burden of production may shift back and forth
during prosecution, the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the Patent
Office.209  Whether a prior art reference is enabling is a question of law
based on underlying factual inquiries.210  On appeal, the question of
whether a reference is enabling is reviewed de novo, and the underlying fac-
tual inquiries are reviewed deferentially.211  Whether a reference anticipates
is a question of fact.212
from anything which still remains in the possession of the public.” (citing Gayler, 51 U.S. at
496)).
204 The process of obtaining a patent—where the inventor or his or her agent or attor-
ney files an application with the Patent Office—is called patent prosecution. ALAN L. DUR-
HAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 37 (4th ed. 2013).
205 In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
206 In re Wilder, 429 F.2d 447, 450 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
207 Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445; In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting
that the Patent Office must establish a prima facie case before any burden shifting occurs).
According to federal regulation:
A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when the information
compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of
evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each term in the claim its broadest
reasonable construction consistent with [what is described in the patent applica-
tion], and before any consideration is given to evidence which may be submitted
in an attempt to establish a contrary conclusion of patentability.
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2)(ii) (2014).
208 Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445.
209 Id. at 1449 (Plager, J., concurring); In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016 (C.C.P.A.
1967).
210 Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm. Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
211 For appeals from the Patent Office, the Federal Circuit reviews the factual under-
pinnings for substantial evidence. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Appellate courts review lower courts’ factual findings in bench trials for clear error. Impax
Labs., 545 F.3d at 1315.
212 In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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b. The Prima Facie Case
The key procedural role for the prima facie case is to establish the exam-
iner’s initial burden of production.213  The reinvention paradigm retains the
prima facie case in its current format for three reasons.  First, in ex parte
matters, it serves as an orderly mechanism for initially producing evidence214
and developing a written record of the proceedings before the Patent
Office.215  Second, it prevents the reinventor (or any applicant) from having
to guess why the examiner believes a claim is unpatentable.216  Third, the
prima facie case reduces arbitrariness to the extent that it requires the Patent
Office to come forward with a sufficient factual basis for denying a patent.217
The prima facie case, however, does much more than determine who
goes first.  The substantive basis for a prima facie case often rests on pre-
sumptions that raise interesting and important questions crucial to patenta-
bility.  In a reinvention scenario, recall that novelty reduces to the question of
anticipatory enablement, which asks if the disclosure in the expired patent
would have enabled a PHOSITA to make X without undue experimenta-
tion.218  For reasons that will be explained shortly, the Federal Circuit has
held that “an examiner is entitled to reject claims as anticipated by a prior art
publication or patent without conducting an inquiry into whether or not that prior
art reference is enabling.”219
c. The Presumption of Enablement
The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals220 articulated a burden-
shifting framework to handle anticipatory enablement issues that arise dur-
ing patent examination.221  As a starting point, at the time of filing, 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 affords the applicant a presumption of novelty because the statute
states that “a person shall be entitled to a patent unless” one of the statutory
exclusions is shown.222  This means that the examiner has the initial burden
213 In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
214 In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
215 Morris, 127 F.2d at 1054.
216 In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Plager, J., concurring).
217 Id.
218 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
219 In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
The presumption of enablement also applies in district court proceedings.  Amgen Inc. v.
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
220 See supra note 36.
221 See In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681–82 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (explaining that anticipatory-
enablement issues are governed by a burden-shifting regime); In re Wilder, 429 F.2d 447,
450–52 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (outlining the burden-shifting process for the anticipatory-enable-
ment inquiry).
222 Wilder, 429 F.2d at 450 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006)).  As former Chief Judge
Paul Michel once explained, “If the claimed invention is patentable, the applicant is entitled
to a patent (because [section 102 of] the statute says so)—not eventually, but as soon as
patentability can be determined.”  Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictabil-
ity in Federal Circuit Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1249 (1994).
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of coming forward with evidence of anticipation;223 yet the examiner can
make a prima facie case whenever a reference specifically describes X by
name or structure.224  Importantly, the examiner can reject the applicant’s
claim to X for anticipation without conducting an inquiry into whether the
asserted prior art reference enables the subject matter.225  Put simply, the
expired patent enjoys a presumption of enablement.226
From a technical standpoint, the presumption rests on shaky ground.  In
unpredictable fields, it can be hard to believe that all asserted prior art is
enabling.  However, the Federal Circuit’s rationale for the presumption is
not based on the technical robustness of the disclosure:
[I]t is procedurally convenient to place the burden on an applicant who is in
a better position to show, by experiment or argument, why the disclosure in
question is not enabling . . . .  It would be overly cumbersome, perhaps even
impossible, to impose on the [Patent Office] the burden of showing that a
cited piece of prior art is enabling.  The [Patent Office] does not have labo-
ratories for testing disclosures for enablement.227
So it seems that the presumption is based on the practical realities of
patent examination.  Nonetheless, it allows a cursory disclosure in a prior art
reference—which would be inadequate to enable X for patent-obtaining pur-
poses—to potentially defeat a later claim of novelty by a subsequent
inventor.228
The next question is whether the presumption of enablement should
apply to X in the reinvention paradigm.  To be sure, squandered subject mat-
ter like X is by definition nonenabled.  In the case of previously disclosed but
unclaimed subject matter, a patent asserted as prior art should not enjoy a
presumption of enablement if it discloses no substantive technical informa-
tion about the subject matter at issue.229  A typical situation is where the
asserted prior art is a “shotgun” reference—a document that discloses, but
does not claim, millions of chemical compounds.230  Importantly, the Patent
223 Wilder, 429 F.2d at 450; accord In re Sun, No. 93-1261, 22 F.3d 1102, 1993 WL 533128,
at *2 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 1993) (“The examiner bears the burden of presenting at least a
prima facie case of anticipation.”).
224 Wilder, 429 F.2d at 451.
225 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
226 Id.; see In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1287–88 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
227 Antor Media, 689 F.3d at 1288; see also In re Morsa, 713 F.3d 104, 110 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(reaffirming the procedural basis for the presumption); Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1355 n.21 (fur-
ther elaborating on the policy basis for the presumption).
228 Cf. In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (noting that a disclosure suffi-
cient to anticipate for patent-defeating purposes may be insufficient to support the patent-
ability of a claim under section 112 of the Patent Act).
229 Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 959 (2011).
230 See In re Schoenewaldt, 343 F.2d 1000, 1002 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (defining a “shotgun”
reference).  One reason for shotgunning is defensive disclosure—deliberately creating
prior art problems for subsequent inventors.  Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in
the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2175, 2175–76 (2000); Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or
Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926, 927 (2000).  A typical strategy is to disclose millions of chemi-
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Office does not conduct a section 112 enablement analysis on unclaimed
subject matter disclosed in an application.231
The reinvention paradigm is different because the compound at issue
(X) was actually claimed in the expired patent.  In theory, the examiner
examined X and concluded (albeit wrongly) that the claim to it was sup-
ported by an enabling disclosure.  Nevertheless, the presumption is some-
what defensible since the Patent Office is presumed to do its job.232
d. The Reinventor’s Rebuttal Evidence
At this point the burden shifts to the reinventor to rebut the presump-
tion of enablement.233  This is the most crucial step in the paradigm, because
failing to rebut the presumption will result in a patent denial.234  The
reinventor must show, through persuasive argument or proof, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that the asserted expired patent is nonenabling with
respect to X and therefore insufficient to have placed X in possession of the
public.235  Facts such as actual experimental data or affidavits from experts in
the field are often “highly probative.”236  However, a successful challenge can
be lodged without resort to expert assistance “[w]hen a reference appears to
not be enabling on its face”237 buttressed by “specific, concrete reasons” to
support the contention of nonenablement.238
Nevertheless, proving that X was nonenabled in the expired patent can
be difficult because “[i]t is actually very difficult to offer rigorous proof that
something cannot be done.”239  This brings to the fore the potential for
hindsight bias.240  In the enablement context, hindsight bias would lead the
cal structures in a patent application with one that is actually enabled.  Then, the applicant
can “claim that enabled compound and get a patent issued on that compound and have
the rest of the [disclosed but unclaimed] structures become enabled prior art . . . .” CHRIS
P. MILLER & MARK J. EVANS, THE CHEMIST’S COMPANION GUIDE TO PATENT LAW 170 n.4
(2010).
231 See MPEP, supra note 148, § 2164.08 (“All questions of enablement are evaluated
against the claimed subject matter.”); see also Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946
F.2d 1528, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Unclaimed subject matter is not subject to the disclo-
sure requirements of § 112; the reasons are pragmatic: the disclosure would be boundless,
and the pitfalls endless.”).
232 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
233 In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
234 In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 707 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
235 In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1287–88 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Amgen
Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
236 In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 315 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
237 In re Morsa, 713 F.3d 104, 110 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
238 Id.
239 Kantrowitz, supra note 119, at 764.
240 Hindsight bias is the cognitive limitation that prevents persons from disregarding
their knowledge of an outcome in assessing past events.  Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Con-
demned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).  Hindsight reasoning
is impermissible in assessing patentability or claim validity. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v.
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examiner to overestimate the PHOSITA’s level of skill, since subsequent
advances in the field might suggest that X could have been made without
undue experimentation.241
When the reinventor submits rebuttal evidence, the examiner must
“start over”242 and “consider all of the evidence anew.”243  The burden of
production may continue to shift as each side presents new evidence;244 but
again, the examiner carries the ultimate burden of persuasion.245  If the
examiner fails to carry the burden, and absent any other grounds for
unpatentability, the reinventor is entitled to the patent.246
2. Illustration
To illustrate how the paradigm would work, I return to the hypothetical
discussed thus far throughout this Article.247  Recall that AcmePharma, the
reinventor, files a patent application claiming X, a fibrate compound that it
has made and found to effectively lower cholesterol in humans.248  At the
time of filing X is, as far as AcmePharma knows, previously unknown since
the compound has not been commercialized and nothing about it has been
disclosed in the technical literature.
Upon receipt of the application, the examiner searches the prior art and
rejects X for a lack of novelty.249  The asserted prior art reference is an
expired drug patent filed in 1980 that discloses and claims (the chemical
structures of) 100 compounds, including X.  The exemplification section250
begins with the following boilerplate language:
The invention will be more readily understood by reference to the examples
below.  The embodiments specifically exemplified are included merely for
the purposes of illustration and are not intended to limit the invention.
Those skilled in the art will recognize, or be able to ascertain using no more than
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (noting that factfinders should be aware of the
“distortion” caused by hindsight bias).
241 Burk & Lemley, supra note 157, at 1199; see also R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estop- R
pel: Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 205 (2002) (“[In
considering] enablement, which is measured through the lens of the knowledge of the
relevant field as of the filing date of the patent application[, a]s the filing date becomes
distant, the potential for . . . hindsight bias[ ] increases.” (footnote omitted)).
242 In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d
1048, 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
243 Id.
244 In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681–82 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
245 See supra note 209.
246 In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011,
1016 (C.C.P.A. 1967); see also In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
247 See supra text accompanying notes 29–36, 143–52.
248 See supra note 29.
249 See supra subsection III.B.1.a.
250 This is the portion of the written description that includes working examples—tech-
nical details about embodiments of the invention that have actually been made.
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routine experimentation, how to make embodiments not specifically exemplified
herein.251
The document then provides full technical details about how to make
and use two of the 100 compounds disclosed and claimed.252  Importantly, it
provides no specific details about how to make X.  Nonetheless, the examiner
can make a prima facie case of anticipation because (1) the subject matter
that AcmePharma seeks to claim (X) is identical to that disclosed in the
expired patent (X); and (2) the expired patent presumably enables a
PHOSITA to make X.253
At this point, the burden shifts to AcmePharma to rebut the prima facie
case.254  Since strict identity is not an issue, the novelty question reduces to
one of anticipatory enablement.  AcmePharma must establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that as of its filing date (2015), the expired patent’s
teachings combined with extant knowledge in the field could not have ena-
bled a PHOSITA to make X without undue experimentation.255
AcmePharma responds to the rejection with argument and proof.  Point-
ing to the Wands factors,256 AcmePharma argues that given the nature of X
(factor three), the unpredictability of organic chemistry257 (factor four) and
the lack of teaching provided about how to make X or compounds like X
(factors one and two), and the current level of skill in fibrate chemistry (fac-
tor five), undue experimentation would be required (factor eight).258  Thus,
the cursory disclosure in the expired patent was nothing more than an “invi-
tation to experiment.”259  A reference that merely “provides a starting point
from which [a PHOSITA] can perform further research in order to [make
X], but . . . is not adequate to constitute enablement”260 and does not qualify
as prior art for novelty purposes.261
251 Such language is ubiquitous in patent documents. See, e.g., Method of Preparing
Dry Powder Inhalation Compositions, U.S. Patent No. 8,075,873 (filed May 6, 2009)
(issued Dec. 13, 2011).
252 See supra text accompanying note 144.
253 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
254 See supra subsection III.B.1.c.
255 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
256 Recall that the Federal Circuit has set forth several factors relevant to the enable-
ment inquiry. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see Impax Labs., Inc. v.
Aventis Pharm., Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (applying the Wands factors in
the anticipatory enablement context).
257 For an instance of the Federal Circuit opining on the unpredictability of organic
chemistry, see Singh v. Brake, 317 F.3d 1334, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also supra text
accompanying note 146.
258 Wands, 858 F.2d at 737.
259 In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
260 Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1198
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)).
261 See supra note 50 and accompanying text; see also Gillman v. Stern, 114 F.2d 28, 31
(2d Cir. 1940) (Hand, J.) (explaining that when considering whether a prior disclosure is
anticipatory, “what ha[s] not in fact enriched the art, should not count [as prior art]”).  As
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To support its argument, AcmePharma adduces evidence to show the
current state of the art of fibrate chemistry.  This is because “it is conceivable
that a prior art reference that was not enabled as of its effective prior art date
could become enabled over time as the knowledge of the PHOSITA
expands.”262  AcmePharma offers an article, Fifty Years of Fibrate Chemistry,
published in a 2015 issue of Chemical Reviews.  The article reveals that fibrates
like X with multiple cyclopropyl functional groups263 have proven elusive.
Based on this information, AcmePharma argues that as of the application’s
filing date, undue experimentation would have been required for a
PHOSITA to make X.  (Note that unlike the PHOSITA, the inventor is one of
extraordinary skill.)264
Upon reconsideration, after weighing all of the evidence, the examiner
withdraws the novelty rejection because the expired patent is nonen-
abling.265  But overcoming the novelty rejection does not guarantee a patent
because AcmePharma must still satisfy other patentability requirements.  For
example, to the extent that fibrate chemistry has advanced over the past
thirty-five years, a PHOSITA might now find that X looks obvious in light of
those scientific advances.266  As discussed below, this would create another
ground of unpatentability.
C. The Role of Nonobviousness
AcmePharma’s ability to prove that the expired patent’s disclosure of X
was nonenabling removes the reference from the prior art for novelty pur-
poses.  Thus, X is new; meaning that AcmePharma should be allowed to
claim X in its own patent.
It might appear that implementing the proposal might open the flood-
gates to reinvention claims, thereby sending a shockwave through the patent
system.  This is highly unlikely since the reinventor must satisfy other patenta-
to whether the expired patent can serve as prior art for the nonobviousness inquiry, see
infra Section III.C.
262 Holbrook, supra note 48, at 10 (“Because enablement is based not only on the prior
art disclosure but also on the knowledge of the PHOSITA, the teaching of a prior art
reference is an ever-moving target, as the PHOSITA’s knowledge grows over time.”).
263 A cyclopropyl group is comprised of three carbons that form a strained, three-mem-
bered ring. JONATHAN CLAYDEN ET AL., ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 369 (2d ed. 2012).
264 See Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(“Inventors . . . possess something . . . which sets them apart from the workers of ordinary
skill . . . .”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 157, at 1189 (explaining that the inventor “almost
by definition is presumed to be one of extraordinary skill”).
265 Once the applicant provides rebuttal evidence, the examiner “must then weigh all
the evidence . . . including the [written description] . . . [and] any new evidence supplied
by [the] applicant [with the] evidence and[/or] scientific reasoning previously presented
in the [initial] rejection and then decide whether the claimed invention is enabled.”
MPEP, supra note 148, § 2164.05.
266 See infra subsection III.C.2.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 33 21-MAR-17 8:45
2017] reinvention 1063
bility requirements.  Chief among them is nonobviousness, which has been
called “[t]he fundamental gatekeeper to patenting.”267
The nonobviousness requirement, embodied in section 103(a) of the
patent statute,268 denies patents for trivial extensions of what is already in the
public domain.269  It does not target inventions that are identically disclosed
in the prior art,270 but rather those that are sufficiently close to the prior art
and within the PHOSITA’s technical grasp at the time of filing.271  The idea
is that even if the claimed invention is new and enabled, a fact-intensive eval-
uation of its technical merit might suggest that a patent should not issue
because the potential benefit that society might derive from the invention
and its disclosure does not justify the costs of granting a patent.272  This is
because the invention does not differ substantially from what is already
known.  Thus, nonobviousness “creates a ‘patent-free’ zone around the state
of the art,”273 allowing the PHOSITA to substitute materials, streamline
processes, and “[make] the usual marginal improvements which occur as a
technology matures.”274  If an invention is obvious, it would have inevitably
come about through routine advances; so the inducement of a patent is
thought to be unnecessary.275
267 John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 789 (2003);
cf. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innova-
tion, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 812 (1988) (describing nonobviousness as the “final gatekeeper
of the patent system”).
268 The statute reads in relevant part:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that
the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the
claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing
date of the claimed invention to a [PHOSITA] to which the claimed invention
pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012).
269 See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV.
1, 6–7 (2007) (exploring the wisdom of denying patents for trivial inventions).
270 This is the role of the novelty requirement. See supra notes 14–16 and accompany-
ing text.
271 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
272 Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 72, at 1594; cf. Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious
Problem: How the Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57, 62 (2008) (“The nonobviousness requirement protects society
against the social costs both of denying a deserving patent and of granting an undeserving
monopoly.”).
273 MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 295 (4th ed. 2015);
see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“[T]he stringent
requirements for patent protection . . . assure that ideas in the public domain remain there
for the free use of the public.”).
274 ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 273, at 295.
275 ALAN DEVLIN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 261 (2014);
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of
PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 886 (2004).
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Nonobviousness is a standard.  Like novelty, it requires a comparison of
the invention that the applicant seeks to patent with the prior art.276  In Gra-
ham v. John Deere Co., the Supreme Court articulated the basic framework for
determining nonobviousness.277  It is a question of law based on the follow-
ing pertinent underlying facts: (1) the scope and content of the relevant
prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the claimed inven-
tion; (3) the PHOSITA’s level of skill; and (4) secondary considerations that
provide objective proof of nonobviousness, such as showing that the inven-
tion fulfilled a long-felt but unsolved need.278  The flexible nature of the
nonobviousness inquiry allows modulation of the standard to optimize incen-
tives279 and encourage investment and innovation in uncertain and perhaps
costly research fields.280
While novelty ensures that an invention is new,281 nonobviousness
ensures that an invention is “new enough” to warrant a patent.282  Even if an
inventor has done something novel, that is not enough—nonobviousness
requires that it be “significantly new, nontrivially new” to justify a patent.283
In some cases a lack of nonobviousness could defeat patentability in the
reinvention paradigm.284  For example, undertaking the factual findings set
276 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
277 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
278 Id. at 17–18.  Subsequent caselaw has established that a conclusion of obviousness
must be supported by clearly articulated reasoning.  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 418 (2007); see also MPEP, supra note 148, § 2141(III) (listing rationales that examin- R
ers can use to support a conclusion of a lack of nonobviousness).
279 DEVLIN, supra note 275, at 261; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent
Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1634 (2003).
280 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 279, at 1581–82 (discussing modulation in the field
of biotechnology).
281 See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
282 CHISUM, supra note 88, § 3.01, at 3-9 (2013); see also Joseph Scott Miller, Nonobvious-
ness: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 1, 2 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007)
(“[N]onobviousness divides the patentably new from the unpatentably new.”).
283 MERGES, supra note 194, at 143.
284 For nonobviousness, it is contemplated that the PHOSITA will combine and modify
the teachings of multiple sources to arrive at the claimed invention.  35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(2012); see also Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“Obviousness can be proven by combining existing prior art references, while anticipation
requires all elements of a claim to be disclosed within a single reference.”).  One question
that arises is whether the examiner can assert the expired patent as prior art for nonobvi-
ousness.  The answer is no—an examiner cannot rely on section 103 to circumvent the
requirement for enabling prior art. In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269, 274–75 (C.C.P.A.
1968).  As Judge Rich once explained:
[A] reference which merely describes a thing . . . without telling how to make
it . . . [will] not support a holding of anticipation unless “[a PHOSITA] could take
its teachings in combination with his own knowledge of the particular art and be
in possession of [it],” or [will] not support a holding of obviousness unless “there
is some known or obvious way” to make the thing . . . .
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forth in Graham285 could reveal that X is very similar in structure and efficacy
to a fibrate compound that is already known.  This could lead the examiner
to conclude that it would have been obvious for a PHOSITA as of the effec-
tive filing date of the claimed invention to make X.286  If the structural differ-
ences between X and the prior art compound are minor, a PHOSITA would
expect them to have similar properties287 and a reasonable expectation of
success in independently arriving at the claimed invention.288  Relatedly, a
PHOSITA seeking to design a fibrate requiring a lower effective dosage
would ordinarily contemplate tweaking known compounds “to try to obtain
compounds with improved properties.”289
Here it is worth reiterating the main point.  Although the reinvention
paradigm would allow a reinventor to overcome novelty hurdles in previously
squandered subject matter, that would not guarantee that the reinvention is
patentable.  Other patentability hurdles like nonobviousness may still bar the
reinventor’s claim.
D. Policy Considerations
The reinvention paradigm fulfills the fundamental purpose of the sub-
stantive patentability requirements because it allows the reinventor to reclaim
(squandered) subject matter that should never have been patented.  While
this clearly benefits the reinventor, it is important to explore the paradigm’s
potential impact on the public and the extent to which it aligns with broader
goals of the patent system.
In re Collins, 462 F.2d 538, 542–43 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)
(first quoting In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 936 (C.C.P.A. 1962); and then quoting Hoeksema,
399 F.2d at 273); see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281,
297 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The test of whether a particular compound described in the prior
art may have been relied upon to show that the claimed subject matter at issue would have
been obvious is whether the prior art provided an enabling disclosure with respect to the
disclosed prior art compound.”).
285 See supra notes 277–78 and accompanying text; see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 399 (2007) (reaffirming the Graham framework for the nonobviousness
inquiry).
286 The PHOSITA’s level of skill (third Graham factor) can be found implicitly.  MPEP,
supra note 148, § 2141(II)(C).
287 For nonobviousness, “it is sufficient to show that the claimed and prior art com-
pounds possess a ‘sufficiently close relationship . . . to create an expectation,’ in light of the
totality of the prior art, that the new compound will have ‘similar properties’ to the old.”
Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting
Aventis Pharm. Deutschland v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
288 See In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Obviousness does not
require absolute predictability . . . . [Just] a reasonable expectation of success.”).
289 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 995–96 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (quoting Takeda Chem. Indus. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2007)); see also KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 421 (explaining that an invention may be found
obvious if it would have been obvious to a PHOSITA to try a course of conduct).
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1. Patent Quality and the Public Interest
Although the Patent Office has come under much fire in recent times
for issuing patents of questionable quality,290 this criticism is not new.291  Pat-
ent quality can be defined as “the capacity of a granted patent to meet (or
exceed) the statutory standards of patentability,”292 or, more simply, “the
likelihood that a court, applying correct standards of patentability and having
knowledge of all relevant information, would find the patent valid if it were
contested.”293  Aside from being technically invalid,294 low-quality patents
impose costs on the legal system, competitors, would-be inventors, and
society.295
One cost of low-quality patents is the proliferation of squandered
claims—the key problem that the reinvention paradigm seeks to address.296
The extent of squandering in any expired patent, and thus its overall quality,
is closely tied to the quality of the underlying examination.297  As discussed
earlier, the principal cause of squandering is noncompliance with the enable-
290 See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 74 (2004) (describing what can happen when the Patent Office “falls down on
the job”); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY
L.J. 181, 181–82 (2008) (exploring criticisms).
291 See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COM-
MISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, S. DOC. NO. 90-5, at 32–33 (1st Sess. 1966) (concluding
that raising the quality of issued patents should be a major objective of the patent system);
P.J. Federico, Adjudicated Patents, 1948–54, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 233, 247–49 (1956) (find-
ing that at least sixty-seven percent of litigated patents are invalidated); Bert Russell, The
Improvement of Our Patent System, 15 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 666, 677 (1933) (quoting an
unprinted report to the Secretary of Commerce on the needs of the Patent Office indicat-
ing that improved quality is “fundamental and necessary” because the work of the Patent
Office “is not sufficiently accurate and authoritative”).
292 R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135,
2138 (2009).
293 Thomas E. Popovich, Comment, Patent Quality: An Analysis of Proposed Court, Legisla-
tive, and PTO—Administrative Reform—Reexamination Resurrected (Part I), 61 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 248, 248 n.2 (1979).
294 Cf. FTC REPORT, supra note 93, ch.1, at 5 (“A poor quality or questionable patent is
one that is likely invalid or contains claims that are likely overly broad.”).
295 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 140, at 1515 (noting that bad patents impose costs on
licensees, potential competitors, and society); Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive
Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 113–39 (2006) (making similar
arguments); John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to
Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 731 (2002) (explaining that legal
actors often must revisit the Patent Office’s work to assess patent validity).
296 See supra Part II.
297 FTC REPORT, supra note 93, ch. 1, at 19. Of course, squandering in most if not all
expired patents could have been avoided if the Patent Office had “paid closer attention to
what the [first] inventor actually disclosed in his specification as an indicator of what the
inventor actually achieved, and . . . restricted the allowed scope accordingly.”  Merges &
Nelson, supra note 24, at 909.
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ment requirement.298  Recall that an examiner who wants to mount an
enablement challenge bears the burdens of both building a prima facie case
of nonenablement and carrying the ultimate burden of persuasion on the
issue.299  The examiner must afford every patent application a presumption
of enablement even if there is minimal teaching disclosed therein.300  For
complex inventions like chemical compounds, the absence of a detailed
teaching, combined with the information asymmetry,301 makes it hard for
examiners to gauge enablement adequately.302  And when combined with
the examiner’s time pressures and incentives,303 it is easy to see how dubi-
ously-enabled patents can slip through the cracks.  This, of course, leads to
the proliferation of squandered claims.
While the reinvention paradigm cannot prevent the issuance of low-qual-
ity patents, it would do much to alleviate the harm caused by squandered
claims.  For the reinventor, the proposed novelty framework removes the
expired patent from the universe of prior art, thereby allowing someone who
can actually comply with the statutory patentability requirements to (re)claim
squandered subject matter.  Indeed, the possibility of reinvention might
accelerate innovation by encouraging firms to engage in socially-productive
races to figure out how to make and use the claimed-but-nonenabled subject
matter.304  For the public, the benefit is twofold.  First, given the high likeli-
hood that the reinventor will develop the (re)claimed subject matter into a
commercializable product, the public will get the benefit of the invention
itself.  The benefit conferred could be enormous—such as when the inven-
tion is a costly new drug that would not have been developed but for the
prospect of a patent.305  Second, the public gets an enabling disclosure that
actually puts useful information into the public storehouse of technical
knowledge.306  This is something that the original patentee did not do.
298 See supra Section I.B.
299 See supra subsection I.B.2.
300 See supra text accompanying notes 106–09.
301 I have argued elsewhere that since the inventor knows more information about the
invention than the examiner, this creates an information asymmetry that “inevitably allows
bad patents to slip through the cracks and further contributes to the patent quality prob-
lem.”  Sean B. Seymore, Patent Asymmetries, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 963, 991–92 (2016); cf.
Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 805, 818
(2011) (exploring the incentives for applicants to behave strategically and withhold certain
information from the examiner, particularly in the absence of an adversarial check).
302 See supra note 117 and accompanying text; see also Seymore, supra note 94, at 143–54
(arguing that evaluating enablement has a strong pro-patent bias).
303 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 290, at 151–52 (noting that since rejections tend to
be more time consuming than allowances, examiners have an incentive to “go easy” on
applications and grant patents); supra note 118.
304 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
305 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
306 See supra subsection I.A.2.
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2. Tradeoffs
One potential criticism about the reinvention paradigm is that the pub-
lic would actually pay for the invention twice.  It granted a patent to the origi-
nal patentee and would do so again to the reinventor—thereby requiring the
public to bear the costs of two periods of exclusivity.  The first question is
whether the reinvention paradigm passes constitutional muster; and the sec-
ond is whether it makes good patent policy.
The Supreme Court has stated that the patent system must, by constitu-
tional command, promote technological progress.307  Patents cannot issue
that would remove extant knowledge from the public domain.308 Indeed, the
statutory requirements of novelty and nonobviousness work in tandem to
ensure that the constitutional mandate is met by denying patents that would
impinge upon the public’s right to unfettered access to technology already
available.309  Put simply, old or obvious inventions cannot be patented.310
But the underlying tenet of the reinvention paradigm is that the previously
claimed-but-nonenabled subject matter never entered the public domain
because it was inadequately disclosed in the expired patent.311  Moreover,
there has been no subsequent disclosure, commercialization, or interest in
the subject matter between the time of the expired patent and the
reinventor’s patent application.312  Thus, there should be no constitutional
objection to reinvention because the public is gaining access to technology
that it did not previously possess.
The preceding discussion reveals why the reinvention paradigm makes
good patent policy.  First, the current novelty framework does not work—it
allows a seemingly trivial disclosure in an expired patent to defeat a subse-
quent claim to the subject matter.  But the public never benefitted from the
first period of exclusivity since the expired patent’s (inadequate) disclosure
did not enrich the public storehouse of knowledge.313  In other words, the
quid pro quo failed because the public was shortchanged.  Reinvention by
contrast, would give the public a technically robust disclosure of the inven-
tion, a high likelihood of a commercializable product, and full possession of
307 See supra notes 68, 79.
308 See supra notes 13, 82.
309 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989); see also
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[N]o
patent should be granted which withdraws from the public domain technology already
available to the public.” (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
310 Commentators agree that novelty is a constitutional requirement. See WALTER-
SCHEID, supra note 74, at 310–11 (2002) (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 6).  Nonobviousness
has constitutional underpinnings in that some standard of creativity might be needed to
support patentability. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (explain-
ing that inventions that are “the results of ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclu-
sive rights under the patent laws” (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
311 See supra text accompanying notes 36–51.
312 See supra Section II.C.
313 See supra subsection I.A.2.
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the invention at the end of the reinventor’s patent term.314  So the public
would benefit from the second period of exclusivity.  Reinvention also solves
the squandering problem315 and promotes the patent system’s fundamental
goals of disseminating technical knowledge and fostering innovation.316
Second, the possibility of reinvention could encourage original inventors
to postpone filing until the invention is “further down the technology devel-
opment path.”317  Instead of claiming broadly at the time of filing and subse-
quently discarding the unpromising or unprofitable subject matter,318
applicants may adopt patenting strategies that involve filing smaller, discrete
applications.319  From a policy perspective much good can come from
delayed filing, including better inventions,320 more efficient patent examina-
tion,321 improved patent quality,322 reduced uncertainty,323 and better
disclosure.324
Third, reinvention might be the only way for the public to ever benefit
from X.  If X is a drug, pharmaceutical companies need an adequate incen-
314 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
315 See supra Section II.A.
316 See supra Section I.A.
317 Cotropia, supra note 109, at 122.  It is also worth noting that reinvention would only
be available to third parties to the original patent.  Thus, original patentees would be
estopped from asserting that the original patent was nonenabling.  This would prevent
evergreening—an attempt by patentees to refresh their expiring patents with new ones by
making minor modifications to subject matter that should go to the public domain.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 375, 420
(2008).
318 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
319 Seymore, supra note 67, at 643 n.108.
320 Further development and refinement of the invention “produce a better inven-
tion—whether it be safer, cheaper, more efficient, more durable, or more effective.” Id. at
654.
321 For example, if the invention is actually reduced to practice at the time of filing, it is
much easier for the examiner to gauge compliance with the enablement requirement. Id.
at 653.  Relatedly, the applicant’s ability to provide more technical information about the
invention allows for a more robust examination and mitigates the examiner’s information
deficit. See supra note 301.
322 That delayed filing allows the applicant to generate more technical information
about the invention and allows for a more robust examination, which translates into
improved patent quality. See supra subsection III.D.1.
323 As Christopher Cotropia explains:
Additional technical information . . . reduce[s] the uncertainty surrounding
the invention before examination begins.  The inventor gains a better handle on
whether the invention provides the wanted results.  Furthermore, the additional
time that passes while [development] is occurring produces more information of
its own.  This all places the actual examination forward in time, giving the inven-
tor more certainty as to the invention’s ultimate commercial worth.
Cotropia, supra note 109, at 123 (citing Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped
Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1075–76 (2007)).
324 Seymore, supra note 67, at 654.
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tive to invest in its development.325  Without the possibility of a patent, phar-
maceutical companies may simply ignore X, which would ultimately deprive
the public of its potential benefit (which could be enormous).326  This
should be a cause for concern given the tremendous benefits that new drugs
provide to society.327
CONCLUSION
While many scholars have written about the ills of patenting underdevel-
oped technology,328 they have all overlooked the squandering problem.
Since the current novelty rules render squandered subject matter unpatent-
able, most of it is probably ignored by private firms that could actually figure
out how to make and use it.  As a result, many socially valuable inventions
never reach the public.  This alone should be a great cause for concern.
It is impossible to gauge precisely how much squandered subject matter
exists in the universe of millions of expired patents.  Since the squandered
subject matter was not enabled in the expired patent and has not been subse-
quently disclosed in any other medium, it stands to reason that the subject
matter was never invented in the past.  And to be clear, this is not a situation
where the trivial disclosure in the expired patent made the invention some-
how inchoate— it never existed until reinvention.  So there is no theoretical
reason why the subject matter cannot be patented again.
Reinvention has a strong normative justification because the reinventor
can actually fulfill the substantive requirements for patentability for subject
matter that otherwise would be lost, forgotten, or overlooked.  Thus, the
reinvention paradigm would be a major triumph for the patent system
because it solves the squandering problem, creates an incentive for firms to
engage in socially beneficial research and development, and gives the public
both a high likelihood of a commercializable product and a technically
robust disclosure of the invention.  It is for these reasons that the second
period of exclusivity can be justified.
325 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 290, at 40–41 (explaining how patents provide the
incentive for costly drug development that would not otherwise occur); BERNICE SCHACTER,
THE NEW MEDICINES: HOW DRUGS ARE CREATED, APPROVED, MARKETED, AND SOLD 51–53
(2006) (explaining the business decision to develop a new drug); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 720–21 (2005) (“Patent
law traditionally takes the lion’s share of credit for motivating investments in drug
development.”).
326 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
327 Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 503, 569–70 (2009).
328 See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 323, at 1090 (discussing how early filing increases
the likelihood of underdevelopment); Cotropia, supra note 109, at 107–19 (same).
